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INTRODUCTION 
Sovereign immunity is a fiction.  But it is a fiction that jurists uncomfortably 
accept as true.  In the words of Justice Stevens, it is “the vainest of all legal fictions.”1
Perhaps, though the moral qualities of the doctrine does not prevent its continued 
application.  For Justice Stevens continues “its persistence cannot be denied, but ought 
not be celebrated.”2 Or consider the description by the Supreme Court in Nevada v. Hall:
“We must of course reject the fiction [sovereign immunity].  It was rejected by the 
colonists when they declared their independence from the Crown… But the notion that 
immunity from suit is an attribute of sovereignty is reflected in our cases.”3 Or again, 
Justice Stevens suggesting that the doctrine of sovereign immunity continues to flourish 
despite the perishing of its “raison d’être.”4
To understand sovereign immunity and its fictional origins, one must understand 
the narratives that surround the fiction.5 Fictions are intangible and depend on normative 
 
1 United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S.596, 622 (1989) (Stevens, J. Dissenting).   
2 Id.  
3 Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 415 (1978).   
4 Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 87 (1988).   
5 Another way of saying this is as Jeff Powell said in The Moral Tradition of American 
Constitutionalism -  that American Constitutionalism requires a normative framework 
that includes both historical and normative descriptions called traditions. See POWELL,
THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 44 (1993). Powell builds his 
argument on the normative tradition as defined by Alasdair Macintyre, who defines 
tradition as “an argument extended through time in which certain fundamental 
agreements are defined and redefined in terms of two kinds of conflict: those with critics 
and enemies external to the tradition…., and those internal, interpretive debates through 
which the meaning and rationale of the fundamental agreements come to be expressed 
and by whose progress a tradition is constituted.”  See id. at 13-14 citing ALASDAIR 
MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE, WHICH REALITY (1988).  Notably, this article suggests that 
the primary tradition or narrative that American Constitutionalism has adopted for 
sovereign immunity is one external to the system, leading to little internal and 
interpretive debate regarding its meaning.  
presuppositions.6 You cannot test a legal fiction by feeling its body or by logical 
deduction.  It’s a non-truth.  But it’s a non-truth that we accept as real, as if it were 
concrete and tangible.  For that reason, legal fictions depend on something outside of its 
own words to support its meaning.  That something is always normative.  It can be in the 
form of stories histories or as proverbial wisdom but it always carries normative weight.  
The narratives that are told in support of fictions become embedded in the legal 
subconscious and in some ways become sacramental in fulfillment of the fiction.  
Fictions could possibly manifest an existence outside of law, but never outside of its 
story.  
 The sovereign immunity fiction raises uncomfortable conclusions.  First, and 
contrary to Justice Steven’s assertion, it is not an acknowledgement that everything the 
government does is always right, but rather, that claims against the government have no 
forum for resolution.  So the majority in United States v. Dalm did not need to consider 
the equitable claims of the matter.  Rather the majority’s analysis is rather terse: (1) 
“under settled principles of sovereign immunity, the United States as Sovereign is 
immune from suits, save as it consents to be sued, and the terms of its consent to be sued 
in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit;”7 (2) a statute of 
limitations requiring that a suit against the government be brought within a certain time 
 
6 See Robert M. Cover, Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4, (1983) 
(“No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists outside of the narratives that locate it 
and give it meaning.  For every constitution, there is an epic, for each Decalogue, there is 
a scripture.”).    
7 Dalm, 494 U.S. at 608 citing United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976); United 
States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941).   
period is one of those terms;8 (3) the court does not have the power to expand Congress’s 
determination of jurisdictional limits;9 and (4) because Ms. Dalm failed to bring her 
action within the prescribed time period, the United States wins.10 Justice Stevens 
chastises this analysis as merely a jurisdictional apology in the face of equitable facts.11 
However, the uncomfortable lesson from the majority may simply be that the sovereign 
sets the boundaries for its own liability.   
 The second uncomfortability is both textual and normative; more precise, it is 
non-textual and normative.  That is, no where in the Constitution’s seven articles and 
twenty-seven amendments are the words “sovereign immunity” construed or construable 
to create a federal immunity. Indeed, if one takes the absence of the textual right in the 
original constitution, together with the Court’s denial of state sovereign immunity in 
Chisolm v. Georgia, one might rightly conclude that sovereign immunity did not cross 
 
8 Dalm, 494 U.S. at 612 citing United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 841 (1986); Block 
v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of University and School Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983).   
9 Dalm, 494 U.S. at 612 citing United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 841 (1986); United 
States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-118 (1979); Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 
310, 318 (1986); United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969) (“waivers of sovereign 
immunity by congress “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.”).   
10 Dalm, 494 U.S. at 609-610.  Ms. Dalm brought an action for recoupment of overpaid 
taxes under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1), which provides jurisdiction in the district courts for 
the recovery of any “internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally 
assessed or collected.  The Court, in its holding required 28 U.S.C. § 1346 to be read in 
para materia with sections 7422(a) and 6511(a).  Section 7422(a) requires that before a 
suit may be instituted for a refund that a claim be presented to the secretary of the 
treasury.  Section 6511(a) required that claims for refund of overpayment of taxes be 
brought within three years of the date the tax return was filed.  The Court found that Ms 
Dalm complied with neither.      
11 Dalm, 494 U.S. at 612.  Justice Stevens also decries sovereign immunity as “majestic 
voices” with a “haunting charm.”  Id. at 616.  Continuing on, Justice Stevens heroically 
defends Bull v. United States, saying the court then, “reasoned not in obedience to these 
siren-like voices but rather under the reliable guidance of a bright star in our 
jurisprudence: the presumption that for every right there should be a remedy.  Id. citing 
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 162-163 (1803).      
the Atlantic with the original colonists.12 This position may be defendable as to state 
sovereign immunity, but towards the Federal Government, Chisolm does not venture so 
far: “I hold it, therefore to be no degradation of sovereignty, in the states, to submit to the 
Supreme Judiciary of the United States.  At the same time, by way of anticipating an 
objection, I assert that it will not follow, from these premises, that the United States 
themselves may be sued.”13 
Chisolm v. Georgia involved a citizen from the state of South Carolina who sued 
the state of Georgia in Federal District Court under Article III, section 2 of the 
Constitution.  Article III, section 2 reads: “The judicial power of the United States shall 
extend to all cases, in Law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the 
United States, and treaties made under their authority… between a State and citizens of 
another state.”14 As we noted above, the Court decided that sovereign immunity did not 
bar the suit between the citizen of South Carolina and the state of Georgia since the 
Constitution specifically authorized such a suit.15 But shortly after Chisolm v. Georgia 
was decided, two and three days to be exact, amendments were proposed on the floor of 
the House of Representatives to correct Chisolm’s erroneous holding and secure 
sovereign immunity towards the states.  One of those amendments was the Eleventh 
Amendment ultimately ratified and which reads: 
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States 
 
12 See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 415.   
13 Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (Dall.) 419, 425 (1792).   
14 U.S. Const. Art. III § 2. 
15 Chisolm, 2 U.S. (Dall.) at 425.  
by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any 
foreign state.16 
Textually the eleventh amendment would appear to put to rest any questions of either 
State or Federal Sovereign Immunity.  State Immunity was directly addressed by the 
terms of the amendment.  But by implication, the Federal government too shielded itself 
from suits; put another way, if the states are protected under the Constitution, how much 
more is the supreme sovereign protected by its own charter. 17 
Chisolm offers further insight as to Sovereign Immunity’s origins – that of the 
peace of the realm as derived by common law.  The court theorizes the possibilities if 
states were not able to sue one another.  If a the State of Georgia injures a citizen of the 
state of South Carolina, South Carolina must remonstrance on behalf of its own citizen.  
If South Carolina has no means of doing so, the allegiance the citizen had to South 
Carolina will naturally become suspect.  So the natural next step is war between South 
Carolina and Georgia.  Because a primary principle of the federal government is 
maintaining peace amongst the several states, it is better to allow a citizen of one state 
sue another state than to force a state of war between the two states.18 But under the 
same logic, the federal authority may not be sued, precisely for the same reason that there 
is no threat of war towards the United States were it to injure its citizen.   
 
16 U.S. Const. Amend. XI.   
17 Chisolm, 2 U.S. (Dall.) at 426 (“The judicial act recognizes the jurisdiction over states.  
Instead of using the first expression in the Constitution, to wit “cases and controversies 
between , etc..” it adopts the second, namely “where a state shall be a party.”  Thus, it 
makes no distinction between a state as a plaintiff or as defendant.”)  Thus according to 
the Judiciary act of 1789 and Article III, the text suggested that Sovereign Immunity as to 
the States was not a valid defense.  
18 Chisolm, 2 U.S. (Dall.) at ___.  Chief Justice John Jay also reaffirmed that sovereign 
immunity would still bar suits against the United States, when it did not against the 
several states.  See Chisolm, 2 U.S. (Dall.) at 478 (Jay, C.J.).   
And Justice ___ may have a valid argument.  Consider the one time that our states 
did enter into combat against one another.  Arguably, its purpose was to vindicate the 
rights of one state’s citizens (the southern states) against the governments of the northern 
states, who tried to politically deprive Southern slave holders the right to certain property.  
Whether we agree with the moral implications of the Southern States’ arguments (which I 
do not) one could argue that were Sovereign immunity a non-possibility, the entire civil 
war could have been no more than one large litigation, perhaps still mired in discovery or 
some other procedural aspect, and rendering the house divided into more of a Bleak 
House pitting one Jarndyce against another.19 
Certainly our Republican origins, the Constitution itself, and the opinion in 
Chisolm v. Georgia begs the question whether sovereign immunity made the trans-
Atlantic journey.  And the answer we get is as unsatisfactory as fictions almost always 
are.  As we have already said, Chisolm v. Georgia was not the beginning of the end for 
sovereign immunity. Instead, Congress reaffirmed principles of sovereign immunity 
towards the states in the Eleventh Amendment, which barred suits from citizens of 
foreign states against a sovereign state.  And since that time, war has not broken out 
between two states to protect one citizen’s rights against that state.20 
In addition to the 1793 Congress that urged the eleventh Amendment directly in 
relation to the Chisolm holding, other early founders certainly believed Sovereign 
Immunity was inherent in the Constitution.  The Federalist Papers contain some of the 
most powerful and politically charged statements relating to Sovereign Immunity and 
 
19 See Bicknel, (Constitution produced litigation instead of revolution).  
20 We of course assume the Civil War to have much more contextual circumstances than 
the southern states protecting themselves against the Northern States.  Rather, properly 
interpreted, the Civil War’s sovereignty problems relate more directly to the Southern 
States protecting their sovereignty against the Federal government.   
form great evidence of its retention in the Constitution.  Among those statements include 
Alexander Hamilton’s concise description of Sovereign Immunity as a form of the social 
contract: 
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be 
amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.  
This is the general sense and the general practice of 
mankind … The contracts between a nation and individuals 
are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and 
have no pretensions to a compulsive force.  They confer no 
right of action independent of the sovereign will. 21 
Hamilton introduces normative concepts into the question of Sovereign Immunity, 
namely that sovereigns have as a natural part of existence immunity from suit by its own 
citizens.    
*** 
 To this point we have described the tensions that federal sovereign immunity 
begets: namely that sovereign immunity leads to uncomfortable results when the 
sovereign acts inappropriately; that sovereign immunity at the federal level is not 
described in any complete detail in the Constitution unlike state immunity (but that by 
implication, and the Supremacy Clause, there may be inferred immunity); and that 
sovereign immunity may be read as a necessary term within the social contract of a 
Federal system both to preserve peace as suggested by Chisolm v. Geogia and as a natural 
result of being sovereign.  Now, a fuller description of federal sovereign immunity will 
illuminate these tensions.   
 
21 THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487-88 (Alexander Hamilton).   
Sovereign immunity is based on the supposition that the sovereign cannot be sued 
without its consent.22 The first case that recognized that sovereign immunity was a bar to 
suits was Cohens v. Virginia.23 Cohens is an important statement for federal sovereign 
immunity because it involved a citizen of the state of Virginia suing the state of Virginia; 
this in contrast to Chisolm v. Georgia which involved a citizen of South Carolina suing 
the state of Georgia.24 In supporting its argument that the federal court maintained no 
jurisdiction to hear a suit brought against the state of Virginia, the court looked to the 
sovereign status of the states prior to the Federal compact.  The Court said:  
It is an axiom in politics that a sovereign and independent 
state is not liable to the suit of any individual, nor amenable 
to any judicial power, without its own consent.  All the 
States of this union were sovereign and independent before 
they became parties to the federal compact: hence I infer 
that the judicial power of the United States would not have 
extended to them, eo nominee upon the face of the 
Constitution.25 
And as we discussed above, the Cohens court came to the same conclusion as Chisolm v. 
Georgia, inferring that the Constitution had in fact extended that judicial power in the 
Constitution, Article III, section 2.   But, the matter before the Cohens court was 
different.  Involving a citizen of the sovereign sued, the Court found no authority in the 
Federal Compact for entertaining judicial power over the state of Virginia.  “The case of 
a contest between a state and one of its own citizens, is not included in [the enumeration 
of Article III, section 2]; and consequently, if the principle I have advanced is a sound 
 
22 United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 204 (1882).   
23 CITE.  As noted above, the Justices in Chisolm v. Georgia, recognized that while 
sovereign immunity would not apply to the states, they were more uncomfortable with 
the same conclusion as applied to the Federal government.  See CITES.   
24 See e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 6 U.S. (Wheaton) 264, 302 (1821); and Chisolm, 2 U.S. 
(Dall.) at ___.  See also _____.
25 Chohens, 6 U.S. (Wheaton) at 303.   
one, the judicial power of the United States does not extend to it.”26 Thus in 1821, the 
principle firmly established was that citizens may not sue their own sovereign except 
where the sovereign consents. 
 This position begged the theoretical and difficult question in the United States – 
who is sovereign that can consent to suit.  The Court in U.S. v. Lee offered a theoretical 
solution.   
Under our system the people, who are there called subjects 
are the sovereign.  Their rights, whether collective or 
individual, are not bound to give way to a sentiment of 
loyalty to the person of a monarch.  The citizen here knows 
no person, however near to those in power, or however 
powerful himself, to whom he need yield the rights which 
the law secures to him when it is well administered.27 
Simply put the people are sovereign in the American republic, owing no allegiance to any 
executive that exists above the law; the question of infallibility is discussed in greater 
detail in Part A.    Thus, the logical doctrine that developed and which holds true today is 
that the United States may not be sued unless Congress, representative of the people 
(sovereign) consents.28 
*** 
 The questions that the above description asks are situated on two different levels – 
a macro and a micro.  On the Micro level, it asks “have we gotten Sovereign Immunity 
right?”  That is, does Justice Stevens have a point when he notes that the institution is out 
of sync with the narrative we tell ourselves about our Constitution.  Or is this a case of 
the trivially true, an inconsistency we have learned to live with.   
 
26 Id. at 303.   
27 United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 204 (1882).   
28 CITE 
On the macro level, it asks a central question of constitutional theory.  That is, 
how do we approach problems that appear to have historical antecedents with 
inconsistent results.  The same analysis could be done with regard to how the 
Constitution can be about freedom, yet still endorse slavery.  This topic, though less sexy, 
is arguably more relevant.29 
The thesis that all of the foregoing, and the balance of this project supports is two 
fold.  Generally, the thesis holds that the notion to sovereign immunity should be tied to 
the ways we define our sovereign.  The way a sovereign is defined may be done in two 
ways: we can either normalize what we want the sovereign to look like, and then work 
out the way that the sovereign legally interacts with his surroundings; or we can define 
the legal boundaries of what the sovereign is bound by, and then normalize him around 
the boundaries.  Said more abruptly, we can either fictionalize our sovereign by telling 
stories about him, and then develop the law of the sovereign around those stories, or we 
can bind the sovereign to reality by tying him solely to the law.  I suggest that in the 
United States, our tendency has been to assimilate to the former, though the nature of our 
Constitution begs the later.  Thus, our judges have told stories of sovereigns and the 
fictions that originate in the English Common Law (which I argue appears to have a fully 
integrated fiction) instead of basing the doctrine on law.  
Part One shows us what a fully fictionalized sovereign looks like.  It uses as an  
example the concept of the King’s Two Bodies to show how stories of Sovereigns take 
shape. This concept of the uncomfortable fiction to describe how Sovereign Immunity’s 
fictions are grounded by form and do indeed flourish and take on new life – even when 
 
29 Though new considerations of how the Thirteenth Amendment and the notion of people as property is a 
modern concern by Jedediah Purdy.  I, then, shall leave that application to him.   
its raison d’être has long past, is most apparent when viewed under the lens of 
antiquarian notions of government and order.  Accordingly, Part A is mostly historical.  
The King’s Two Bodies held that the King of England was contained in a dual body – 
one natural and one mystical.  The Natural body was subject to decay and to death while 
the mystical body never died, never aged, never was impaired.  Accordingly, the kingly 
body never suffered at law, because the King was the law and ever maintained the law. 
From the King’s Two Bodies, we show how the normative fiction becomes embedded in 
the narrative of English theory.  Drawing on Fortescue, Locke, and Blackstone, we show 
three different narratives, all dealing with the same themes, but all trying to make sense 
of the twin-bodied king.  Part I ends by surveying American conflation of Blackstone and 
Lockean theory in its understanding of sovereignty.  
 Part two turns to the American Context.  Having already in this introduction set 
forth the way things are regarding sovereign immunity, Part II outlines three approaches 
that have been taken when approaching the problem of sovereign immunity. The first is 
the John Jay / James Wilson approach to throw out both the narrative and the institution 
of Sovereign Immunity under a strict construction of the American narrative.  The 
second, is an approach by Justice Story and Justice Holmes which co-opts the features of 
the sovereign described and places them within a specific American body; the result is a 
highly nationalistic sovereign, with nationalistic aims.  The third considers the Reihnquist 
Court’s treatment of sovereignty as taking the aims of the British story (without the 
narrative features itself) and using them to sustain a federalist view point some of the 
time and a Nationalistic view at other times.   
For the reasons described in part three none of these approaches are particularly 
satisfying. Part three then offers this author’s solution – a fourth way of viewing 
sovereign immunity that incorporates the original conceptions of sovereign immunity 
with a narrative about the constitution – an aspect of each of the prior narratives that is 
omitted.  It begins by placing the sovereignty/ sovereign immunity discussion within a 
narrative that explains both its nationalism and federalism dimensions.  It continues by 
suggesting that rhythmic patterns envelope the debate and create reactionary decisions by 
courts and legislatures.  The better way, as this author suggests, is finding a narrative that 
makes sense Constitutionally, for a doctrine that is not found in the document.  
 This project is intended to be different from other works relating to sovereign 
immunity as it tends to support the dispensability of the fiction for the purpose of 
governmental power.  In this regard, it contrasts the position adopted by the distinguished 
Professor Jaffe who suggested that sovereign immunity was unnecessary as a theoretical 
inquiry when pursuing claims against government officials.30 Jaffe’s analysis begins by a 
thorough consideration of writs against the Crown from Bracton forward.  Jaffe’s 
conclusion, that “Sovereign immunity, whatever it is or is not, has never had, and does 
not have today much impact on the judicial control of administrative illegality,” is more 
realist than this work is intended to be.31 Indeed, Jaffe somewhat acknowledges what one 
conclusion that this project draws: that fictions animate themselves and create new 
fictions.  He says in the very beginning “by a magnificent irony, this body of doctrine and 
practice, at least in form so favorable to the subject, lost one-half of its efficacy when 
 
30 See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963). 
31 Id.  
translated into our state and federal systems.”32 He means to tell us that the doctrine as 
alive in England did not relocate the writs of action against governmental officials to the 
new world.  And accordingly, the fiction continued to beget new forms of the fiction and 
derived new life.   
 
32 Id. at 2.   
